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Introduction
“Chávez y su alianza política representan principal, aunque no exclusivamente, los intereses de los pobres
y empobrecidos del proceso sociopolítico venezolano... En contraste, sus adversarios…han recibido el
respaldo mayoritario de los sectores medios y altos de la población” (López Maya 2004, 114).
“Chávez won [the 2000 elections] with the support of all social classes, including the top 10 percent of
income earners. … According to the data, support for Chávez was not rooted in class cleavages or class
consciousness” (Molina and Pérez 2004, 120).

The two quotes above underscore a conflicting interpretation of Venezuelan
society since President Hugo Chávez Frías was first elected to office in 1998. On the one
hand, many scholars, like López Maya (2004), have recognized that Chávez’s position in
the presidency exacerbated already existing class-based social polarization in the country.
On the other, different scholars, including Molina and Pérez (2004), have asserted that
Chávez’s election had little effect on social polarization in the country and that his
surprising wins in 1998 and 2000 demonstrate the at least short-term cross-class nature of
his support by the end of the 1990s.
Which of these contradictory hypotheses about Chávez and polarization in
Venezuelan society is more accurate? The purpose of this study is to compare the two
arguments reflected in the citations above by looking at the strength and nature of class
polarization before and after Chávez came to power in 1998. In essence, the study seeks
to understand how Chávez’s remarkable election in that year may have impacted social
polarization in Venezuela.
In an attempt to increase our understanding of social polarization in Venezuela,
the study performs a series of crosstabs and means tests in order to assess the association
between social class and a series of political as well as economic and social variables in
Venezuela in 1995 and 2000. In this way, the pages to follow compare the competing
hypotheses on social polarization before and after Chávez came to power in an effort to
understand better how Venezuelan society changed in the last five years of the 20th
century.
I demonstrate that the strengthening of social polarization in Venezuela between
1995 and 2000 did not occur, a conclusion that supports the arguments of Molina and
Pérez (2004) and others. Moreover, the associations between class and political, social,
and economic variables were very weak in both years, lending further support to their
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conclusions. That said, the association of the upper middle class in particular with
different variables changed considerably between 1995 and 2000, suggesting that this
class has reacted the most strongly to Chávez’s election in 1998. Thus, while the
strengthening of class-based social polarization may not have been apparent between
1995 and 2000, there were signs by 2000 that it could be materializing between the upper
middle and more popular sectors of Venezuelan society.
The following pages are divided into four sections. The literature review provides
a definition of social polarization as it is understood within the context of this study and
also examines with more detail the two contrasting hypotheses on social polarization in
Venezuelan society after 1998. The next section then looks at the statistical analyses
used to test the competing hypotheses. It is followed by an analysis of the results from
the tests performed. Finally, the last section will draw some initial conclusions about the
strength and nature of social polarization before and after Chávez was elected.
Review of the Literature
Before examining social polarization in Venezuela, it is important to understand
what we mean by polarization. In general, many scholars (Esteban and Ray 1994,
Seshanna and Decornez 2003, Wolfson 1994) agree that polarization means a movement
towards the poles on any given issue including, for example, low-income versus highincome groups, liberals versus conservatives, or the lower class versus the upper class,
which is the principle continuum of interest for this study. Movement away from the
middle and towards the poles of these continuums signifies a polarization on a topic.
Thus, polarization can be defined by a “disappearing middle” (Wolfson 1994, 354).
In order for polarization to occur there must also be a concentration or
convergence of groups around specific locations on the continuum. These clusters should
share similar attributes internally, and they must have dissimilar attributes with other
groups on the continuum (Esteban and Ray 1994, 819). With these characteristics in
mind, then, Esteban and Ray identify three features that must be present in order for
polarization to have occurred: (1) there must be homogeneity within each cluster; (2)
there must be heterogeneity across clusters; and (3) there must be a small number of
significantly sized groups (Esteban and Ray 1994, 824). These features are employed in
the definition of polarization used for the Venezuelan case study examined here.
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Scholarship on polarization in Venezuela is a relatively new trend. Prior to the
meteoric rise of Hugo Chávez to power, the country was known for its uneventful and
unusually stable democratic regime. Given the political and economic turmoil in many of
its Latin American neighbors, Venezuela seemed an anomaly. Enriched economically by
its vast oil reserves and bolstered politically by a pact between the two primary political
parties,1 Venezuela was able to weather the economic crisis of the 1980s and remained
democratic despite the intense periods of civil war and military regimes outside of its
borders (Naím 2001, 18). Because of the cross-class nature of the dominant political
parties (Roberts 2003b, 56), the unity and homogeneity of Venezuelan society was in
large part assumed. In many ways, Venezuela was considered a “near perfect”
democracy (Ellner 2003, 7).
The Venezuelan political system endured for almost thirty years as a stable
partyarchy (Coppedge 1994 and 1996). By the end of the 1980s, however, many
Venezuelans began to question the “illusion of social harmony” (Naím 2001, 27) in the
country. The two-party system was accused of being corrupt and exclusionary. The shift
to neoliberalism drastically reduced the size of the public sector, limiting the corporatist
and clientelist linkages they depended upon for support, while also sparking mass
protests by the country’s lower and working classes throughout the 1980s and 1990s.2
Hugo Chávez arrived on the national stage during the heart of this period of social
and political turmoil. A former lieutenant colonel in the army, Chávez was incarcerated
for helping organize a failed coup attempt in 1992. Relatively unknown until the time of
his imprisonment, he emerged from prison as a national hero to many who had long since
rejected the political system in Venezuela (Canache 2002b, 14). Capitalizing on this
newfound popularity, Chávez organized his own political party, the Movimiento Quinta

1

The Pact of Punto Fijo was signed in 1958 between the two principal political parties in Venezuela,
Acción Democrática (AD) and Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente (COPEI). It
consisted of an agreement between AD and COPEI to respect election results, consult between the two
parties on controversial issues, and split political responsibility and patronage (Kornblith and Levine 1995,
45). Because of the Pact, the two parties ruled the political system (and alternated the presidency) for
almost four decades. For more on this party system see Kornblith and Levine 1995, Myers 1998, and
Coppedge 1994 and 1996.
2
The Caracazo, which took place for five days starting on February 27, 1989, sparked bloody and
traumatic urban riots that resulted in the deaths of dozens of Venezuelans (Kornblith and Levine 1995, 389).
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República (MVR), and ran for president in 1998. He won handily in the second round,
beating his closest opponent, Henrique Salas Römer, and winning 56.2% of the vote.
From the beginning, Chávez distinguished himself as a political outsider.
Untainted by corruption and a “master of antipolitics” (Roberts 2003a, 37), he presented
himself as the alternative to the two-party system that had dominated the political system
for decades. In essence, Chávez drew distinctions between his appeal to the marginalized
sectors of Venezuela society and the upper and middle-class nature of the political elite in
the country (Ellner 2003b, 2).
Thus, Chávez openly recognized and exploited the social polarization that some
argue (Roberts 2003b, López Maya 2004) had long existed in Venezuelan society.
Indeed, because of his overt seduction of the poorer and working sectors in the country,
many scholars have attributed to him at least partial blame for the polarized nature of
Venezuelan society by the end of the 1990s. “Repudiado y desconocido” by some,
“amado y respeitado” by others (López Maya 2004, 104), the election of Hugo Chávez,
they argue, exacerbated class-based polarization in Venezuela.
Importantly, these authors do not contend that Chávez is the primary cause of
polarization in the country. For example, many (Roberts 2003b, López-Maya 2004)
purport that class-based cleavages emerged more than ten years prior to Chávez’s first
election. Roberts (2003b) highlights the longstanding economic crisis in the country as
well as inconsistent market-based reforms as the impetus for social marginalization. The
first clear sign of this, he argues, was in February 1989, when President Carlos Andrés
Pérez implemented an economic austerity program. The severity of this measure, which
compounded the effects of drastic cuts in social spending throughout the 1980s, provoked
five days of violence and rioting, now known as the Caracazo.
Of note, Roberts points out, was the class-based nature of the Caracazo. Pérez’s
economic measures were rejected much more forthrightly by the lower and working
classes than the upper and middle classes (Roberts 2003b, 63). Social polarization, then,
existed prior to Chávez’s ascent to the presidency. Yet, Roberts also recognizes the
impact Chávez had in terms of institutionalizing social polarization during his first years
in office. Once Chávez was in power, he recognizes, “the political loyalties of elite and
popular sectors became more clearly differentiated” (Roberts 2003b, 56). Thus, while
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Chávez may not be the original cause of social polarization in the country, he did help to
express and exacerbate polarization after 1998.
Proponents of the hypothesis that there was more social polarization in Venezuela
after Chávez became president agree with Roberts that Chávez exacerbated rather than
provoked social polarization in the country. In particular, they identify three principle
expressions of social polarization that were either initiated by Chávez or by his
opponents: the 1998 presidential campaign, which polarized voters along class lines;
Chávez’s fiery rhetoric, which stoked polarization by actively courting the poor sectors of
Venezuelan society while rejecting their richer counterparts; and the 2002 failed coup
attempt, which was justified by some or reviled by others according to whether or not
they supported Chávez.
For many scholars (Ellner 2003a, López Maya 2004), the 1998 election of Hugo
Chávez, as well as the campaign leading up to it, reflected the growing social polarization
in the country. For one, supporters for Chávez and his primary opponent, Henrique Salas
Römer, were divided along class lines. The middle and upper class-led media (and their
readers and viewers) preferred Salas Römer to Chávez. Indeed, the once divided middle
class became united in their opposition to Chávez. For his part, Chávez lashed out
aggressively at his adversaries – a style, as Ellner contends, that may have been oriented
towards his lower class supporters (Ellner 2003a, 22). Chávez’s campaign and his
electoral victory, then, was an important one for underscoring the newly surfacing social
polarization in the country.
The election of Chávez had further implications for polarization in the country.
For example, his government formalized the “hegemonic fight” that had been playing out
between two social poles in the country: one that represented the poor and impoverished
in Venezuelan society and the other that symbolized the middle and upper classes in the
country (López Maya 204, 114). While social polarization may have resulted from
Venezuela’s socioeconomic problems after the 1980s, it was exacerbated by the election
of an “anti-politics” politician. It was also exacerbated by the actions of that politician
once he took over the presidency.
Indeed, Chávez’s fiery rhetoric as a presidential contender and then as president is
also highlighted as a reason why Chávez exacerbated social polarization in Venezuela.
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Specifically, as one author contends rather explicitly,“[Chávez] ha recurrido
permanentemente a un discurso pugnaz, discriminatorio y ofensivo descalificando a sus
opositores y exponiéndolos al escarnio público” (López Maya 2004, 115). He has
provoked the opposition through his discourse, labeling them as oligarchs and
differentiating his government from the elite in an effort to court the popular sectors.
Exploiting the already prevalent polarization in the country (Roberts 2003a), Chávez
explicitly appealed to the overwhelmingly poor majority, mostly to his advantage
(Cannon 2004, 293).
Finally, for many (Cannon 2004, López Maya 2004), the failed coup attempt of
April 20023 represented perhaps the clearest manifestation of social polarization in
Venezuela after Chávez came to power. Organized primarily by the upper and middle
class-based opposition, their attempt to depose Chávez was eventually overcome by a
counter civil-military mobilization (comprised primarily by the lower classes) in support
of the president (Maya López 2004, 115). That is, those who supported the coup and
those who rejected it were divided clearly along class lines. Venezuelans, at the time,
were either for Chávez or against him.
In many ways, for the “more polarization” scholars identified here, Chávez is a
key ingredient for understanding why Venezuela became more socially polarized by the
end of the 1990s. His blistering anti-elitist rhetoric, along with events such as his first
election in 1998 and the failed coup attempt in 2002, helped to exacerbate the polarized
nature of Venezuelan society since he took over the presidency. This “more polarization”
literature, however, represents only one trend among current Venezuelan scholars. The
other, equally pervasive view on the election of Chávez and the nature of Venezuelan
society by the end of the 1990s contends that Venezuela was in fact not more polarized
after Chávez’s elections. It is to this second perspective that we now turn.
To make their argument that, in the years between 1995 and 2000, Venezuelans
may have been less polarized in terms of political support, the following authors
(Canache 2002a and 2002b, Weyland 2003, and Molina and Pérez 2004) use both
qualitative as well as quantitative analysis, an empirical element that is notably missing in
3

A complete analysis of the 2002 coup attempt is outside the scope of this paper. For a more detailed
examination of the events that took place before, during, and after the coup, see Cannon (2004) and Ruiz
Petit (2003).
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the “more polarization” literature. Looking at different survey results between 1995 and
2000, these authors demonstrate that support for Chávez was cross-class in nature during
the time of his first and second elections.4 That is, contrary to the argument that the
election of Chávez exacerbated social polarization in the country, this literature suggests
that, in fact, Chávez in many ways united Venezuelans across class, at least in the shortterm.
Canache (2002a, 2002b) looks at the nature of support toward Chávez before he
was elected, in 1995, and in the year of his first election, or 1998. Arguing that
Venezuela is a “fragile democracy” (Canache 2002b, 6), Canache contends that support
for democracy in the country is more consequential than in other, more established and
stable regimes. She thus assesses the nature of democratic support in Venezuela with
regards to support for the incumbent, the political system, and for democracy as a regime.
In 1995, she finds, support for Chávez, as an influential political leader, was concentrated
in the hands of those who opposed democracy. This appeal was particularly strong
among women, youth, and the poor (Canache 2002b, 150).
By 1998, however, the nature of his support had changed and, in particular, had
broadened to encompass more than just those who were ambivalent towards democracy.
While, in the year that Chávez was elected, those who were ambiguous about their
support for democracy still represented an important Chávez constituency, he had also at
this time garnered the support of those who supported democracy but were extremely
unhappy with the country’s then current political system. A majority of voters shared a
“disdain for the status quo and a willingness to hand the reins of government” over to
Chávez (Canache 2002a, 83). In essence, by 1998 Chávez had unified Venezuelans
against the political elite in the country. In this way, the country was less polarized at the
time he was elected than just three years prior.
Another author (Weyland 2003) supports Canache’s claims that many
Venezuelans were united in their high expectations of Chávez’s first administration.
While ultimately a paper on the nature of economic voting in Venezuela, Weyland’s
article also draws conclusions about the characteristics of Chávez’s supporters in 1998.
Specifically, like Canache, he contends that in 1998 Venezuelans became unified in their
4

Chávez was elected president for a second time in 2000, after the adoption of a new Constitution in 1999.
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hope and optimism towards Chávez (Weyland 2003, 825-6). Using a multinomial logit
model, Weyland finds that Venezuelans dissatisfied with the actual state of democracy in
the country were more likely to vote for Chávez. Thus, in 1998, when dissatisfaction was
widespread among Venezuelans so, too, was support for Chávez. As a result, Chávez
supporters were “socially heterogeneous and multiclass,” (Weyland 2003, 833) a
conclusion that contradicts the “more polarization” literature examined above.
Finally, like Canache and Weyland, Molina and Pérez (2004) use empirical
analysis to explain Chávez’s 2000 presidential victory, as well as the victory of the MVR
in the National Assembly elections of the same year. They contend that government
evaluation and personality politics were the primary reasons for Chávez’s re-election.
Yet, they also draw some conclusions about the nature of polarization in Venezuela in
2000. Skeptical of the notion that “most of President Chávez’s support came from the
lower classes, while the middle and upper classes rejected him,” Molina and Pérez
demonstrate that, in fact, Chávez won his second term in office with the support of all
social classes, including a portion of the highest income earners in the country (Molina
and Pérez 2004, 119-120). They conclude that short-term variables, and not longstanding
ones, such as structural cleavages, had the greatest impact on Venezuelan voters in 2000.
In all four works referenced above, empirical evidence is used to debunk the
hypothesis that Venezuela became more socially polarized after Chávez took over the
presidency. Instead, they argue, Venezuelans actually unified around Chávez for a short
time, because they so strongly rejected the political system that preceded him.
Interestingly, both Canache (2002a) and Weyland (2003) suggest that the nature of this
cross-class support is most likely ephemeral. For example, although Chávez was elected
with almost 60% of the vote in 2000, that same election was marked by high levels of
abstention. This could suggest the emergence of “an undercurrent of dissatisfaction”
toward Chávez and his government (Canache 2002a, 85), one that may have manifested
itself only after the 2000 election had taken place.
Weyland, too, suggests that the origins of support for Chávez in 1998, that is, an
“exalted optimism” in his government and a belief in his charisma, might have blinded
Venezuelans from recognizing the painful reality that Chávez had not fulfilled many of
his campaign promises (Weyland 2003, 825-826). Thus, Chávez’s honeymoon may be
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limited to the first years of his presidency, when “wishful thinking” (Weyland 2003, 845)
dominated Venezuelan society. After 2000, then, Venezuela could presumably become
more polarized around the leader as sectors of society become less enchanted with his
actions as president.
Leaving open this possibility that social polarization may only be just emerging in
2000, the literature above presents two contradictory hypotheses that can and should be
tested in order to advance the literature on polarization in Venezuela. Given the two
recurring trends in present-day Venezuelan scholarship, the hypotheses to be tested are
the following:
Hypothesis #1 (H1): Venezuela is more polarized along class lines in 2000 than in
1995; social polarization was exacerbated after Chávez’s 1998
election.
Hypothesis #2 (H2): Venezuela is not more polarized along class in 2000 as compared
to 1995; Chávez’s 1998 election did not exacerbate social
polarization in the country.
The following section explains how these two hypotheses are tested, as well as the
overall limitations to the study’s findings.
Methodology
To test these competing hypotheses, the study uses the World Values Survey
(WVS), a cross-cultural standardized survey organized by Ronald Inglehart at the
University of Michigan. The WVS covers a broad list of human values and goals
pertaining to politics, economics, gender roles, family values, civic engagement, and
religion, among others. In essence, the goal of the study, which is now entering into its
fifth wave, is to “provide a comprehensive measurement of all major areas of human
concern” and identify cross-national variance in these areas (World Values Survey
website).
Venezuela participated in two of the four waves of the WVS that have already
been carried out: the third wave (March-April 1996) and the fourth (NovemberDecember 2000).5 The timing of the two surveys in Venezuela straddles Chávez’s initial
5

The 1996 wave in Venezuela included 1500 respondents and was run by the DOXA Institute, in Caracas.
Gustavo Mendez, Jose Molina, and Friedrich Welsch were the principal investigators who carried out the
survey (University of Michigan, WVS website). The 2000 wave had 1,200 respondents and was organized
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election to the presidency in 1998 and thus allows us to compare social polarization three
years prior to his election (1995) and two years after he had been in office (2000). Unlike
the other empirical analyses above, then, with the WVS we have an unprecedented
opportunity to measure social polarization before and after his dramatic ascent to power.
Moreover, the WVS allows us to measure polarization using the opinions and behaviors
of Venezuelans themselves. This “mass opinion” approach (Canache 2002b, 72) to
testing our competing hypotheses will add an important missing element to the debate on
social polarization before and after Chávez became president.
The competing hypotheses tested in this study address the exacerbation of a
particular kind of polarization in Venezuela, that is, social polarization. Social
polarization entails the concentration of groups or clusters based on class, ethnicity, or
race (Lozada 2004, 196). The specific manifestation of social polarization measured
below is class-based, since most of the literature on Venezuela referenced here focuses on
the concentration of Venezuelan opinion and attitudes around class cleavages or clusters.
Social polarization, it is argued, manifested itself through the “mutual resentment
between lower classes and relatively privileged sectors of the population” (Ellner 2003a,
21).
In order to test our two competing hypotheses, this study compares social
polarization in Venezuela in 1995 and 2000. If the analyses below reveal that 2000 is
more polarized along class lines than five years prior, H1 is supported. If, on the other
hand, 2000 is not more polarized or is as polarized along class lines as in 1995, H2 is
supported. The methodology for measuring social polarization in Venezuela is threefold.
First, the study determines the strength of polarization as expressed through class
cleavages in 1995 versus 2000. It then analyzes the nature of the polarization, that is,
where it converged among Venezuela’s different classes. Finally, it examines how social
polarization impacted, if at all, support on different issues in Venezuela before and after
Chávez’s 1998 election. By taking this multi-dimensional and comparative approach to
the extent of social polarization in Venezuela in 1995 and 2000, we should be able to
draw some conclusions about the competing hypotheses tested here.

by the Red Interuniversitaria de Cultura Política (REDPOL). Headed by José Molina, this fourth wave
entailed a random sample stratified by state and by municipality (World Values Survey website).
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The Strength of Polarization in 1995 vs. 2000
López Maya (2004), Lozada (2004), and Cannon (2004) support the notion that
the election of Chávez has exacerbated the polarization of Venezuelan society. This
polarization is expressed through the strengthening of class cleavages. Specifically, the
upper and middle classes ally more with the conservative, anti-Chávez opposition,
whereas the lower and working classes identify with the radical, left-leaning Chávez
camp. The first part of the statistical analysis below addresses whether these class
cleavages in 2000 are apparent with respect to 1995, as well as their associational
strength. The third and fourth waves of the WVS provide questions that allow us to
measure this relationship between class and ideology. These questions, along with all
other WVS questions referenced in the following pages, are spelled out in full in
Appendix A.
In both waves, the respondents are asked to identify where they fall along a range
of different class categories: upper class, upper middle class, lower middle class, working
class, and lower class. This subjective class variable is used throughout the analysis
below to measure polarization along class lines, or social polarization. In the WVS, these
subjective class categories are coded from 1 to 5, where the upper class is 1 and the lower
class is 5. To avoid confusion in the interpretation of our tests, these categories were
recoded so that the lower class is 1 and the upper class is 5. Moreover, because the
survey respondents overwhelmingly classified themselves in the lower, working, and
lower middle classes,6 the upper and upper middle responses were joined to create one
“Upper Middle” response.7 By recoding this upper middle class, we fulfill the third
feature of polarization identified by Esteban and Ray, that is, that there be a small number
of significantly sized groups (1994, 824).
The WVS in both the third and fourth wave also asks respondents to rate
themselves on a Left-Right scale of 1 to 10, where 1 is the most left-leaning and 10 is the
most right-leaning. This Left-Right identification variable is used to measure the
potential polarization of Venezuelan society, as divided into subjective class clusters,
6

Specifically, in 1995, the self-identified upper and upper middle classes made up 5.3% of the total
population sample. In 2002, they were 19.1% of the sample.
7
Henceforth in the study, the term “upper middle class” is used to refer to this combined variable. It is
important to stress, however, that when I use this term I mean both the upper and middle classes and not
just the elite sectors of Venezuelan society.
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along this ideological continuum. To test this relationship, we run two different crosstabs analysis. The first analysis measures the association of Left-Right identification, on
the one to ten scale, by the four categories of subjective class identification. The second
analysis is based upon the survey’s mean response to the Left-Right identification in both
1995 and 2000. By recoding a Left-Right dummy variable in which Left self-identifiers
are more than one standard deviation below the mean and Right self-identifiers are more
than one standard deviation above the mean, it is possible to measure the association
between class and unambiguously Left and Right self-identifiers.
By comparing the Chi-Square and Gamma from each of these tests in 1995 and
2000, we can determine whether there has been a strengthening of the association
between class and ideology. That is, we can observe if the relationship between the
upper middle class and the Right and the lower class and the Left has become more
polarized. If this is the case, then social polarization will have increased between 1995
and 2000, supporting H1. If this is not the case, H2 is confirmed. Moreover, having
isolated the unambiguously Left and Right respondents in each of the four class
categories, it is possible to analyze the actual movement of the class clusters along the
Left-Right continuum. In this way, we can evaluate if clustering has occurred
increasingly away from the middle, a feature important to polarization (Wolfson 1994,
354). If, for example, the percentage of responses increases along this Left-Right
dichotomous variable, then social polarization will have occurred, and H1 is supported.
If the percentages stay the same or decrease, then H2 is supported.
The Nature of Polarization in 1995 vs. 2000
The second approach to measuring social polarization looks specifically at where
polarization occurred among the four different subjective class categories between 1995
and 2000. Specifically, we run a means test in 1995 and 2000 of Left-Right identification
by subjective social class, in order to obtain the standard deviations for each of the four
individual class categories, that is, upper middle class, lower middle class, working class,
and lower class.
By comparing the intra-class standard deviations in 1995 and 2000, we can
determine where the convergence of class-based opinion may have occurred. If, for
example, the standard deviations diminished the most in the upper middle and lower
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classes, then it can be argued that cleavages have been concentrated in these categories.
In other words, clustering has occurred around those two classes, resulting in a hardening
or homogenizing of intra-class opinion (Esteban and Ray 1994, 824). Polarization has
converged in the upper middle and lower classes, and H1 would be supported. If the
standard deviations of the individual class categories stay relatively unchanged, then H2
would be supported, since the nature of social polarization would not have changed
between 1995 and 2000.
Social Polarization and Venezuelan Opinion
Finally, once established the extent to which social polarization has occurred
between 1995 and 2000, as well as the concentration of that polarization along the four
class categories, the study examines how it is associated with different measures of
political support. The purpose of this last analysis is to assess whether the polarization
identified through the statistical tests above is reflected in manifestations of support for
different variables relevant to the political context of the late 1990s. Is there a
convergence of opinion around these issues similar to that which occurred between
subjective class and Left-Right identification? Alternatively, is social polarization
exacerbated in some areas but not in others between 1995 and 2000?
Specifically, we run cross-tabs analyses to measure the association between
subjective class and support for the current or incumbent government; satisfaction in the
previous government; whether the government should provide for individuals; and
whether public or private-based industry should increase. The logic behind testing the
four questions is that the opinions on each of these topics may have changed between
1995 and 2000, given the election of Chávez in 1998. For example, if polarization is
more pronounced in 2000, one reflection of it would be with regards to incumbent
support. Presumably, if Chávez is a polemic figure and the MVR explicitly cultivated
party support based upon class lines (Molina and Pérez 2004, 120), two arguments of the
“more polarization” literature, then support for the incumbent in 2000 should be much
more class-based than in 1995, since the lower and working classes would support
Chávez and the upper and middle classes would not. Following a similar logic, support
(or lack thereof) for the previous regime would be more polarized in 2000 than in 1995,
since the lower and working classes would be more likely to view the past regime
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unfavorably in comparison to that of Chávez. On the other hand, if the upper middle
class views Chávez negatively, then it might look more favorably on the previous regime.
The final two associations examine the responses to questions that run more
closely along programmatic lines. For example the WVS asks if the government should
ensure that everyone is provided for or if it is the role of people to provide for
themselves. The responses range from 1, or total agreement with the former statement, to
10, or total agreement with the latter. It also the poses the question of whether private or
public (government) ownership of business should be increased, where 1 signifies total
agreement with increasing private ownership and 10 means total agreement that
government ownership should be increased.
Each of these questions should reflect the alleged ideological differences between
Chávez supporters and the opposition (López Maya 2004). Given Chávez’s populist
rhetoric and his electoral campaign against privatizing such industries as PDVSA, the
aluminum industry, and DIANCA (Ellner 2003, 15) the responses to these questions by
those for and against Chávez would presumably be polarized. Specifically, anti-Chavista
responses to both surveys should more strongly agree with people providing for
themselves and an increase in private business. Chávez supporters should more strongly
agree with the government ensuring that all are cared for and that businesses are publicly
owned. If the hypothesis on more polarization (H1) is correct, the association between
class and these two questions will be such that the lower and working classes (that is,
Chávez supporters) would align with a more state-oriented view of social and economic
policy and the upper middle class (the anti-Chavistas) will align with the more
individually-oriented perspective. Moreover, this association will strengthen between
1995 and 2000.
Finally, in order to determine where polarization is occurring, a means test is
carried out for all four questions to measure the change in intra-class standard deviations
in 2000 versus 1995. By analyzing the shifts in standard deviations, we can compare
where polarization is concentrated in terms of these four questions, just as we do with the
Left-Right identification above. Thus, it will be possible to evaluate if manifestations of
social polarization in Venezuela are consistent across different issues.
Limitations
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By evaluating each of these measures of social polarization, we can draw some
conclusions about the nature and extent of polarization in 2000 versus 1995 and whether
it has been exacerbated, as H1 purports, or not, as H2 asserts. There are a few limitations
to this study that should be highlighted before examining the results of the analyses
outlined here. For one, the measure of social class is unavoidably subjective in both the
1995 and 2000 surveys, since no other class measure was used consistently in both WVS
waves. This inevitably means that the definitions for each of the class subcategories –
upper, upper middle, lower middle, working, and lower classes – are entirely dependent
upon the respondents’ understanding of how these different categories are defined.
Thus, the study loses validity, given that the class variable is not standardized
along more objective, quantifiable, and thus more consistent lines. This limitation
inescapably weakens any conclusions about social polarization, since there is no
guarantee that our results can be replicated. On the other hand, some have argued that the
perception of the general public may be more important in classifications like these than
any formal measures, since polarization has more of a subjective quality to it than a more
quantitative and objective measure of class-based clusters, such as actual income
(Seshanna and Decornez 2003, 5). In other words, polarization may be felt more than it
is observed or measured. Still, there is no conclusive evidence to support Seshanna and
Decornez’s contention. For the purposes of understanding social polarization in
Venezuela, then, further research should be carried out to support the initial conclusions
drawn here.
The other limitations are more surmountable in terms of the conclusions we can
draw about social polarization in 2000. For one, there is an overwhelming bias in both
the 1996 and 2000 Venezuelan surveys towards the lower and working classes (see
footnote 5 above). However, this should have a conservative impact on our results. That
is, any association that is found between class and the different variables examined here
would have had to overcome the small (but significant) N for the upper middle class in
each survey and would thus strengthen our conclusions about social polarization after
Chávez’s 1998 election. Moreover, the 2000 survey was carried out on the heels of
Chávez’s second presidential victory, where he garnered a higher percentage of the
popular vote (59.8%) than in 1998 (Molina and Perez 2004, 117). Presumably, support
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for Chávez at this time would be more widespread than later in his second term, when his
opposition became more organized and active.8 This limitation should also have a
conservative impact on the results below. Thus, any conclusions about an increase in
social polarization after 1998, despite his popularity in 2000, would be more convincing.
Results9
The Strength of Polarization in 1995 vs. 2000
Table One in Appendix B10 displays the results from the first crosstabs analysis,
which measures the association between the full Left-Right identification variable (that
is, coded from 1 to 10) and subjective class as well as the dummy Left-Right
identification variable and subjective class. As the table demonstrates, both Models show
statistically significant associations between class and the Left-Right measures. Both
also have very small Gammas, however, which mean that the observed association
between the two variables is very weak.
More importantly for the purposes of this study, the direction of the associations
found in Model 1 and Model 2 changes from 1995 to 2000. For example, in 1995, the
Gamma registers a negative value for both models, at -0.099 and -.213. This means that
the higher the social class a respondent comes from, the more that respondent identifies
with the Left. The upper middle class-left association strengthens in the second model,
where only the unambiguously left-leaning and right-leaning respondents are included.
This association contradicts the expected relationship between class and ideology, as
hypothesized by the “more polarization” literature above. Yet, the association is also
consistent with the social conditions that would have been necessary to bring Hugo
Chávez to power. Associated with the Left in 1995, the upper middle classes may have
been sympathetic to the populist, more leftist appeals of Chávez, helping him become
elected in 1998.
In 2000, however, the association is inversed. The upper middle class is no
longer associated with the Left. Instead, the Gammas are positive in both models,
8

2002 was a particularly active year for the opposition in Venezuela. Along with mounting an
unsuccessful coup on 11 April 2002, they also carried out an extended general strike that would shut down
much of the economic activity in the country.
9
In order to be able to compare the results from 1995 and the 2000, the 2000 WVS was weighted to have
the same N (1500) as the 1995 WVS. All the tests run below use the 2000 weighted variable.
10
All tables referenced in the Results section can be found in Appendix B.
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reflecting a relationship between class and ideology that is more closely aligned with the
class cleavages hypothesized in H1. As in 1995, Model 2 registers stronger classLeft/Right relationships than Model 1 in 2000, providing additional support to the
apparent shift in the measured associations. By 2000, then, the upper middle class allied
itself more closely to the Right than the lower classes. Likewise, the lower classes were
more strongly associated with the Left.
To explore in more detail the apparent ideological shift between 2000 and 1995,
Table 2 provides the percentage of respondents from each class that identified themselves
as unambiguously Left- or Right-wing. As the table shows, there does appear to be a
shift among both the lower and upper middle classes in terms of Left-Right identification.
Specifically, by 2000, the upper middle class that is unambiguously on the Right has
risen by over 12% from 1995. Likewise, the lower class respondents identifying with the
Left rose from 25.8% in 1995 to 46.3%, or more than twenty percentage points.
The association between subjective class and Right-Left identification follows the
predicted relationship in H1, where the upper middle class is more closely aligned with
the Right and the lower class with the Left. Yet, social polarization – that is, a greater
concentration among class-ideological lines – was not as apparent. That is, while there
were clusters of Left-Right identification among the lower class and upper middle class
respondents in both 1995 and 2000, the movement of those classes away from the center
between 1995 and 2000 – an indication of stronger polarization – was not evident.
Instead, the upper middle and lower class clusters appeared to have switched places on
the Left-Right continuum. For H1 to be more clearly supported, the concentration of
class and Left-Right identification would have had to move closer to the Left-Right poles.
This was not the case.
The Nature of Polarization in 1995 vs. 2000
Still, the substantial shift of the upper middle and lower classes in terms of their
realignment along ideological lines between 1995 and 2000 merits further attention, as it
is here that many authors (López Maya 2004, Roberts 2003b) have argued that the
polarization has occurred most strongly. Was there a hardening of opinion among these
classes between 1995 and 2000? If so, the case could be made that social polarization
after Chávez’s election was just beginning to manifest itself along ideological lines in
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2000. This section, then, looks at the nature of social polarization in Venezuela before
and after Chávez came to power, to see where it may have begun to materialize by 2000.
Table 3 shows the intra-class standard deviations that resulted from a means
analysis of Left-Right identification by subjective class in both 1995 and 2000. By
calculating the differences in standard deviation between the two survey years, we can
determine how much more or less the responses of each social class fluctuated in 2000 as
compared with 1995. Where the standard deviations decreased the most, yielding a
higher value in terms of the difference between 1995 and 2000, we would expect a
concentration or convergence of intra-class Left-Right identification to have taken place.
This would lend support to the argument (H1) that there was greater social polarization
along class lines after Chávez came to power. On the other hand, if the difference in
standard deviation is negative, that is, the standard deviation is higher in 2000 than in
1995, then the Left-Right identification among that class would have diverged or become
less concentrated between the two survey years, denoting a decrease in social
polarization.
In fact, as Table 3 demonstrates, intra-class Left-Right identification became the
most concentrated among the classes that Roberts and López Maya hypothesized. The
positive difference in standard deviations is largest in the lower class (.431) and
especially the upper middle class, where the standard deviation decreased by 0.557, or
more than half a point on the ten-point Right-Left continuum. Table 3, then, portrays the
greatest concentration of ideological identification in the upper middle and lower classes.
There appears to be a hardening or homogenizing of opinion around these two classes.
The interpretation of Table 3 lends initial support to H1. Yet, it is important to
note that the standard deviations across all four classes are still quite high, a finding that
is consistent with the overall weak association between subjective class and Left-Right
identification in Table 1. Still, as with Table 2, the results from the means test suggest
that the opinion of the upper middle class in terms of where they find themselves on the
Left-Right continuum shifted and became more concentrated in 2000 versus 1995. Thus,
the more leftist political orientation associated with the upper middle class in 1995 could
have been ephemeral and a reflection of the almost universal societal discontent towards
the longstanding political parties in Venezuela. Likewise, the concentration of the upper
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middle class along more right-oriented political lines in 2000 may be in reaction to the
radical changes institutionalized by Chávez after his 1998 election.11 This anti-Chavista
reaction would most likely escalate following his second election in 2000, suggesting that
polarization may only be just beginning to emerge in 2000.
Social Polarization and Venezuelan Opinion
Thus far, it appears that both H1 and H2 have underscored important
characteristics of Venezuelan society in 2000: whereas social polarization appears to be
emerging in 2000 in the hypothesized direction as indicated by H1, society did not
necessarily become more polarized in 2000 versus 1995 – a conclusion that supports H2.
The objective of the final four crosstabs tests in this section is to assess whether the
emerging social polarization identified above is reflected in manifestations of support for
different variables pertaining to the political context of the late 1990s. Does Venezuelan
opinion towards these variables become more concentrated among the upper middle and
lower classes in 2000, as with Left-Right identification? Or do the patterns of
associations vary? As with the following sections, there is no definitive answer to these
questions.
Table 4a portrays the association of incumbent support with subjective social
class. Specifically, the upper middle class was more satisfied with the current
government in 1995 than the lower class. In 2000, these associations shifted in the
expected direction: the lower class was more satisfied with the incumbent, that is,
Chávez, than the upper middle class, although the association is no longer significant and
the Gamma associated with 2000 is even weaker than that of 1995. Thus, the pattern of
association between subjective class and incumbent support was not sufficiently
prevalent to merit significance in 2000.
It should be noted that this result is consistent with the overall support for Chávez
at the time the survey was carried out. In 2000, Chávez was celebrating a presidential
victory in which he received a higher percentage of total votes than in 1998. It makes
sense, then, that his support at the time crossed classes. And, indeed, the intra-class
11

In particular, Chávez drafted a new constitution in which he strengthened the executive vis-à-vis the
other branches by extending the term in office, allowing for re-election, and expanding the president’s
power over the Armed Forces. He has also adamantly pursued the centralization of industry and the
Central Bank (Cannon 2004, 293). All of these initiatives represented a clear departure from the actions of
the political elite who preceded him.
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standard deviations of the incumbent support variable increased in 2000, as Table 4a also
demonstrates, suggesting that social polarization had not yet materialized around support
for Chávez. Thus, the results from Table 4a reflect support for H2.
Table 4b reveals the results of the association between satisfaction in the previous
regime and subjective class in both survey years. Here, the shift in associations between
the two variables between 1995 and 2000 reflects more closely the perceived shifts in
Table 1. That is, in 1995, the upper middle class was associated with lower levels of
satisfaction in the previous regime than the lower class, a pattern that corresponds with
the upper middle classes more positive appraisal of the incumbent at that time.
By 2000, this association had inversed. While the lower class was more closely
associated with negative views of the past regime, the upper middle class was much more
satisfied with that regime. Here, the association between class and previous regime
satisfaction is weaker than in 1995, although the Gammas for both years are in general
very low. Still, opinions on the previous regime were the most strongly concentrated in
the upper middle and lower classes in 2000 versus 1995, suggesting, as with Table 3
above, that social polarization may be materializing between these two groups in 2000,
particularly with regards to their assessment of the previous regime.
The final two tabs look at the potential manifestations of social polarization
along more programmatic variables. In particular, Table 4c displays the results of the
association between government responsibility and subjective class in 1995 and 2000.
Table 4d gives the results of the relationship between an increase in public or privateowned businesses and subjective class. The logic behind each of these tests is that if
Venezuelan classes are becoming more polarized along ideological lines, then that
polarization should be reflected in survey questions that address social and economic
policy. The crosstabs analyses in Tables 4c and 4d allow us to address these
perspectives.
The results from Table 4c suggest that there is an association between government
responsibility and subjective class in 1995, although that positive association is no longer
significant by 2000. Specifically, the perspective that people should be responsible for
themselves is no longer significantly associated with the upper middle class. Indeed, in
2000, government responsibility in general is no longer related to subjective class. This
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conclusion is supported by the fluctuation in standard deviations between 1995 and 2000.
Whereas the working class varied the most in terms of their responses to this question
between both survey years, the convergence of intra-class opinion on this question across
the four class categories was almost non-existent. Clearly, classes are no more polarized
around this issue than they were in 1995, a conclusion that supports H2. It also lends
credence to the arguments of Molina and Pérez (2004) and Naím (2001) that Venezuelans
of all classes may have placed an unusual amount of hope in the capacity of the
incumbent government to alleviate the socioeconomic problems in the country after
Chávez’s 1998 election.
Finally, the association between an increase in public versus private-owned
companies and subjective class reflects the shift in associations denoted in both Tables 1
and 4b. Whereas, somewhat surprisingly, the upper middle class was more closely
associated to a desire for an increase in publicly-owned industries in 1995, this
association had switched in the expected direction by 2000. That is, by 2000, the higher
the class in which you identified yourself, the more likely you were to support an increase
in private enterprise. The fluctuations in standard deviations between 1995 and 2000
reflect this shift in associational patterns. Three of the four classes (the lower middle
class is the exception) diverged with regards to their response to this question in 2000
versus 1995, although the increase in standard deviations were in general quite small.
Overall, the results from these four crosstabs analyses suggest that social
polarization had not been exacerbated along subjective class lines, as H2 hypothesized.
Yet, in two of the four tests carried out, the associations measured support the contention
that social polarization may have begun to take shape in 2000. Specifically, satisfaction
toward the previous regime and the belief in more public or private-owned businesses
experienced shifts in their associational patterns in a direction that supports greater social
polarization along upper middle/lower class lines.
Of importance, too, was the role the upper middle class had in changing
associational patterns in many of the crosstabs carried out here. In particular, where
opinions did converge in 2000 versus 1995, they appeared to do so most strongly in this
social class. This was true for both Right-Left identification and satisfaction with the
previous regime. The hardening of the opinions and perspectives of this class may reflect
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their growing negative reaction to Chávez after 1998 but particularly in 2000 and beyond,
as asserted by much of the polarization literature (López Maya 2004, Cannon 2004).
In general, however, given the statistical analyses carried out here, it is too early
to support either H1 or H2 definitively. On the one hand, H2 is supported by the
associational patterns identified above: the intensity of the predicted associations between
subjective class and different variables did not strengthen, as the literature says it should
in order for there to be polarization. On the other hand, there was clearly activity and
change registered along class lines between 1995 and 2000; in most cases, these
associational shifts moved in the direction hypothesized in H1. The Left-Right
identification of Venezuelans, as well their perspective on different political, social, and
economic questions, did show a modest convergence around the upper middle and lower
classes. In this sense, the intensity of social polarization may very well have intensified
in the years following 2000.
Conclusion
Given the mixed results of the analyses above, it is only possible to draw tentative
conclusions about the nature of social polarization in Venezuela in 2000 versus 1995.
While social polarization did not necessarily strengthen between the two survey years
available for this study, the associational patterns used to measure that polarization did
shift in the direction that the “more polarization” literature had hypothesized. Thus, it
seems that social polarization was only beginning to materialize in the most recent WVS
wave.
Indeed, it is clear that something happened between 1995 and 2000 to cause the
observed shifts in associational patterns between subjective class identification and the
variety of variables tested here. These inverse shifts in associations were especially
prevalent among the upper middle class, a characteristic that may represent a
foreshadowing of that class’s role among the opposition in the years to come, a
conclusion that was hinted at by Canache (2002a) and Weyland (2003) but never
developed fully. Specifically, the upper middle class nature of the anti-Chavistas in 2002
– that is, those responsible for both the failed coup attempt and the extended general
strike – suggest that the burgeoning social polarization identified in 2000 was not just an
anomaly. If the interpretations presented here are correct, and social polarization was
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only in its beginning stages in 2000, then we should expect social polarization to deepen
during the rest of Chávez’s controversial presidency. Thus, it will be important to
continue to explore the associations between subjective class and different social,
political, and economic variables in the years to come, particularly as the fifth wave of
the WVS becomes available after 2006.
This study has served to further the discussion on the state of polarization in
Venezuela, demonstrating through quantitative analysis that the debate on social
polarization in the country is by no means over and should continue. For it is clear that
past notions of Venezuela as a “near perfect” democracy veiled underlying political
tensions among and within the country’s social classes. The analyses here have helped
flesh out some of those tensions. Work in the future should explore them even further, in
order to understand their implications and underlying causes.
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APPENDIX A
1995 World Values Survey Questions:
Subjective Class Identification
(V226): People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the working class, the middle
class, or the upper or lower class. Would you describe yourself as belonging to the:
1. Upper class
2. Upper middle class
3. Lower middle class
4. Working class
5. Lower class
9. Don't know [DO NOT READ OUT]
Left-Right Identification
(V123): In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right." How would you place your
views on this scale, generally speaking?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Left
Right
DK = 99
Incumbent Support
(V165): How satisfied are you with the way the people now in national office are handling the
country's affairs? Would you say you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, fairly dissatisfied or very
dissatisfied?
1. Very satisfied
2. Fairly satisfied
3. Fairly dissatisfied
4. Very dissatisfied
9. DK
Support for Previous Regime
(V151): Where on this scale would you put the political system as it was ten years ago?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Very Bad
Very Good
DK = 99
Private versus Government Ownership
Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this
scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree
completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can
choose any number in between.
(V126):
1: Private ownership of business and industry should be increased
10: Government ownership of business and industry should be increased
Government Responsibility
Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this
scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree
completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can
choose any number in between.
(V127):
1: The government should ensure responsibility to that everyone is provided for
10: People should take more take more responsibility to provide for themselves

28

2000 World Values Survey Questions:
Subjective Class Identification
(X045): People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the working class, the middle
class, or the upper or lower class. Would you describe yourself as belonging to the:
[01] Upper class
[02] Upper middle class
[03] Lower middle class
[04] Working class
[05] Lower class
[-1] Don't know
[-2] No answer
[-3] Not applicable
[-4] Not asked in survey
Left-Right Identification
(E033): In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right." How would you place your
views on this scale, generally speaking?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Left
Right
DK = 99
Incumbent Support
(E125): How satisfied are you with the way the people now in national office are handling the
country's affairs? Would you say you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, fairly dissatisfied or very
dissatisfied?
[01] Very satisfied
[02] Fairly satisfied
[03] Fairly dissatisfied
[04] Very dissatisfied
[-1] Don't know
[-2] No answer
[-3] Not applicable
[-4] Not asked in survey
Support for Previous Regime
(E112): Rate political system: In countries where no regime change has taken place: ten years ago
[01] Bad
[02] 2
[03] 3
[04] 4
[05] 5
[06] 6
[07] 7
[08] 8
[09] 9
[10] Very good
[-1] Don't know
[-2] No answer
[-3] Not applicable
[-4] Not asked in survey
Private versus Government Ownership
Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this
scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree
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completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can
choose any number in between.
(E036):
1: Private ownership of business should be increased
10: Government ownership of business should be increased
Government Responsibility
Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this
scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree
completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can
choose any number in between.
(E037):
1: People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves
10: The government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for
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APPENDIX B
TABLE 1
Left-Right Self-Identification by Subjective Class
(Crosstabs Analysis)
Model 1
1995

2000

Model 2
1995

2000

Chi Square
(df)

57.08**
(27)

58.062***
(27)

9.06*
(3)

7.85*
(3)

Gamma

-0.099

0.056

-.213

.143

Source: World Values Survey 1995-1996, World Values Survey 2000-2001
N = 1500 in both Models
* Significant at < 0.05
** Significant at .001
*** Significant at .000
Notes:
Model 1: where subjective class coded (1) Lower Class to (4) Upper Middle Class and Left-Right SelfIdentification coded (1) Left to (10) Right.
Model 2: where subjective class coded (2) Lower Class to (4) Upper Middle Class and Left-Right SelfIdentification coded (0) Left and (1) Right.
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TABLE 2
Concentration of Unambiguously Left vs. Unambiguously Right Identification by
Subjective Class
(Crosstabs Analysis, in percentage)
1995

2000

Left

Right

Left

Right

Lower

25.8

74.2

46.3

53.7

Working

37.2

62.8

35.5

64.5

41.5

58.5

28.3

71.7

46.4

53.6

34.1

65.9

Lower
Middle
Upper
Middle
Chi Square
(df)
Gamma

9.06(3)*

7.85(3)*

-.213

.143

Source: World Values Survey 1995-1996, World Values Survey 2000-2001
N(1995) = 531
N(2000) = 468
* Significant at <0.05
Notes: Subjective class coded (2) Lower Class to (4) Upper Middle Class and Left-Right Self-Identification
coded (0) Left and (1) Right.
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TABLE 3
Left-Right Identification by Subjective Class
1995 vs. 2000
(Standard Deviations)
1995

2000

Difference

Lower Class

3.076

2.645

0.431

Working Class

2.972

2.843

0.129

Lower Middle
Class

2.987

2.583

0.404

Upper Middle
Class

3.194

2.637

0.557

Total

3.015

2.655

0.36

Source: World Values Survey 1995-1996, World Values Survey 2000-2001
N(1995) = 1090
N(2000) = 1213
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TABLE 4a
Satisfaction with Incumbent by Subjective Class
1995 vs. 2000
(Standard Deviation, Crosstabs analysis)
1995

2000

Difference

Lower Class

0.857

0.937

-0.08

Working Class

0.746

0.941

-0.195

Lower Middle
Class

0.845

0.953

-0.108

Upper Middle
Class

0.764

0.922

-0.158

Total

0.798

0.942

-0.144

Chi Square
(df)

32.43***
(9)

13.06
(9)

Gamma

-.055

0.047

Source: World Values Survey 1995-1996, World Values Survey 2000-2001
N(1995) = 1462
N(2000) = 1470
*** Significant at .000
Notes: Subjective class coded (2) Lower Class to (4) Upper Middle Class and Satisfaction with Incumbent
coded (1) Very Satisfied to (4) Very Dissatisfied.
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TABLE 4b
Satisfaction with Previous Regime by Subjective Class
1995 vs. 2000
(Standard Deviation, Crosstabs analysis)
1995

2000

Difference

Lower Class

3.476

2.76

0.716

Working Class

3.207

3.228

-0.021

Lower Middle
Class

3.344

2.826

0.518

Upper Middle
Class

3.259

2.694

0.565

Total

3.300

2.868

0.432

Chi Square
(df)

79.72***
(27)

50.144**
(27)

Gamma

-0.061

0.002

Source: World Values Survey 1995-1996, World Values Survey 2000-2001
N(1995) = 1430
N(2000) = 1455
** Significant at .004
*** Significant at .000
Notes: Subjective class coded (2) Lower Class to (4) Upper Middle Class and Satisfaction with Previous
Regime coded (1) Very Bad to (10) Very Good.
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TABLE 4c
Government Responsibility by Subjective Class
1995 vs. 2000
(Standard Deviation, Crosstabs analysis)
1995

2000

Difference

Lower Class

3.567

3.45

0.117

Working Class

3.303

3.609

-0.306

Lower Middle
Class

3.498

3.439

0.059

Upper Middle
Class

3.454

3.417

0.037

Total

3.414

3.464

-0.05

Chi Square
(df)

68.45***
(27)

31.74
(27)

Gamma

.026

.012

Source: World Values Survey 1995-1996, World Values Survey 2000-2001
N(1995) = 1393
N(2000) = 1490
*** Significant at .000
Notes: Subjective class coded (2) Lower Class to (4) Upper Middle Class and Opinions about Government
Responsibility coded (1) Government should be Responsible to (10) People should be Responsible.

36

TABLE 4d
Public vs. Private-Owned Business by Subjective Class
1995 vs. 2000
(Standard Deviation, Crosstabs analysis)
1995

2000

Difference

Lower Class

3.326

3.349

-0.023

Working Class

3.106

3.364

-0.258

Lower Middle
Class

3.455

3.255

0.2

Upper Middle
Class

3.118

3.304

-0.186

Total

3.244

3.315

-0.071

Chi Square
(df)

97.59***
(27)

41.953**
(27)

Gamma

0.014

-0.034

Source: World Values Survey 1995-1996, World Values Survey 2000-2001
N(1995) = 1346
N(2000) = 1438
** Significant at .03
*** Significant at .000
Notes: Subjective class coded (2) Lower Class to (4) Upper Middle Class and Opinions about Public vs.
Private-Owned Business coded (1) More Private-Owned Business to (10) More Public-Owned Business.
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